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_____________________________________________ >
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Original Petition From a Decision by the 
Commission of Fair Employment and Housing
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Third District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
In April, 1987, Kenneth C. Phillips, Real Party in Interest, 
filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing (Department). (C.T. 6.) In January, 1988, Gail Randall, 
Real Party in Interest, also filed a complaint with the 
Department, id. Both complaints alleged that Evelyn Smith 
(Respondent) discriminated against them on the basis of their 
marital status when she did not rent them housing. (C.T. 7.) 
Based on the complaints, the Department issued an accusation 
charging Smith with unlawful discrimination. (C.T. 7.)
The Fair Employment cuid Housing Commission (Commission) 
concluded that Respondent had unlawfully discriminated against
1
Phillips and Randall, but it did not rule on Respondent's claim of 
freedom of religion. (C.T. 11-12.) The Commission ordered 
Respondent to cease and desist discriminating, sign and post 
copies of notices announcing her unlawful actions, and pay damages 
to Phillips and Randall. (C.T. 14-15.)
Respondent petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of 
mandate to set aside the Commission's decision. (C.T, 22-23.)
Both parties stipulated to dismiss the Superior Court action and 
proceed by original petition to the Court of Appeal. (C.T. 28.)
Respondent petitioned the Court of Appeal, Third District, 
for the same writ of mandate. (C.T. 22.) The Court of Appeal 
issued an alternative writ in order to address an issue of first 
impression. Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission. 30
Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1013, r^v. granted. __ Cal. 4th __, S040653
(1994). That issue was whether the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing 
based on marital status, is unconstitutional if it is applied to 
someone who discriminates against an unmarried couple by refusing 
to rent housing to them based on a religious belief. Id. at 1014. 
The court held that the Commission order penalizing Respondent on 
the basis of the FEHA violated her rights under both the United 
States Constitution and the California Constitution, id. at 1014.
This Court granted review on September 8, 1994. __ Cal, 4th __,
33 Cal. Rptr. 567, S040653.
Statement of Facts
Respondent owns and leases four rental units in Chico, CA. 
(C.T. 3.) She rents the property for commercial purposes and 
reports the income as business income. (C.T. 3.) Respondent 
advertises the apartment in the local newspapers to fill any 
vacancies, (C.T. 3.) When prospective tenants inquire about a
2
vacancy. Respondent tells them she only rents to married couples 
due to religious reasons. (C.T. 3-4.) Respondent believes that 
sex outside of marriage is a sin and that God will judge her if 
she rents the apartment to unmarried couples. (C.T. 4.)
In response to Respondent's advertisement, Phillips and 
Randall drove by the vacant apartment and took special interest in 
the unit due to its convenient location, particular neighborhood, 
architecture style, cuid well-maintained premises. (C.T. 4.) When 
they called the next morning. Respondent told them that she was 
not willing to rent to an unmarried couple and asked them how long 
they had been married. (C.T. 4.) In order to get the apartment, 
Phillips falsely represented to Respondent that he and Randall 
were married. (C.T. 4.)
On April 7, Respondent rented the apartment to Phillips and 
Randall. (C.T. 5.) Later that day, Phillips told Respondent that 
they were not, in fact, married. (C.T. 5.) Respondent replied 
that she could not rent the apartment to an unmarried couple 
because it would violate her religious convictions. (C.T. 5.)
She returned the rental deposit, and the couple never moved into 
the vacant apartment. (C.T. 5.)
Hurt and angered by Respondent's rejection, Phillips and 
Randall began to look for a suitable place to live. (C.T. 5.) As 
a result of their continuing search, they took time out of work 
and purchased a listing of apartments from a rental agency. (C.T. 
5.) Seven months later, they found an apartment that was less 
conveniently located and more expensive than the unit that 
Respondent had declined to rent to them. (C.T. 5.)
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Questions Presented
Does the Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibit a landlord 
from discriminating against a couple based on their unmarried 
status?
Does the ^ith incidental effect test, which was established 
by the United States Supreme Court for cases involving a 
burden on the right to free exercise of religion, apply to a 
California case based on a free exercise claim?
Does a neutral, generally applicable law apply to a 
landlord who discriminates against unmarried, cohabitating 
couples based on a religious belief that fornication is a 
sin?
4
V
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SUMMARY or ARGUMBNT
The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals 
must comply with a neutral, generally applicable law that 
incidentally affects the free exercise of religion. Respondent 
urges this Court to disregard the Supreme Court's decisions and 
allow her to unlawfully discriminate through an exemption from the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act and the California Unruh Act.
Such a decision would have serious repercussions. Not only 
would it allow Icuidlords to unlawfully discriminate and therelcy 
deny individuals the fundamental necessity of housing, it would 
undermine the state of California's goal of providing a decent 
home and living environment to its citizens. Furthermore, 
allowing an exemption from this law would permit every landlord 
and business establishment to defy existing laws and establish 
their own.
Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the burden on her 
free exercise of religion outweighs the state's interest in 
eradicating housing discrimination. Close consideration of the 
minimal, if any, burden on Respondent, and the overwhelming 
importance of preventing landlords from denying individuals 
housing based on arbitrary standards, compels reversal of the 
Court of Appeal decision allowing Respondent an exemption from 
anti-discrimination laws.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IS A DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE
LEGAL ISSUES.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Since only issues 
of law are in question, the correct standard of review for this 
Court is independent, or de novo review of the legal issues.
People V. Louis. 42 Cal. 3d 969, 985 (1986).
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II. THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT PROTECTS
UNMARRIED COUPLES FROM DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING BASED
ON THEIR MARITAL STATUS.
A prerequisite to any discussion regarding the constitutional 
issues presented in this case is an analysis of the reasons why 
Phillips and Randall fall within the marital status protection 
enumerated in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The 
California Legislature adopted the FEHA with the intent of making 
it unlawful to arbitrarily discriminate in housing and employment. 
Cal. Gov't Code § 12920 (West Supp. 1995), Government Code 
section 12955(b) makes it unlawful for the owner of any housing 
accommodation to make an inquiry concerning the marital status of 
any person seeking to rent housing. Cal. Gov't Code § 12955 (West 
Supp. 1995). Due to the legislative intent, relevant case law, 
and considerations of public policy, Phillips and Randall are 
protected based on their marital status.
A. Interpretation of the Term “Marital Status"_in
the Fair Employment and Housing Act to Include
Unmarried Cnuoles is Not only Reasonable, but
Compelled.
1- The fundamental rule for interpreting a
statute, which is to discern and effectuate
the intent of the legislature, reveals that
marital status includes unmarried couples.
When interpreting a statute, the fundamental rule for a court 
is to determine the intent of the legislature so that it can 
effectuate the purpose of the law. People v. Black. 32 Cal. 3d 1, 
5 (1982). The court must first look to the plain meaning of the 
statute's language. Id. The plain meaning of marital status can 
reasonably be interpreted to include unmarried couples. A 
reasonable definition of marital status includes persons who are 
unmarried and cohabitating, married, single, divorced, widowed, or 
separated. E.g., Swanner y. Anchorage Equal Rights _Commission.
6
874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994), cert, denied. __ U.S. __, 115 S.
Ct. 460 (1994). In addition to the reasonable interpretation of 
marital status, extrinsic sources also demonstrate that the 
legislature intended to include unmarried couples under the 
protection of the FEHA, including, but not limited to, the 
statutory scheme of the statute, relevant case law, and public 
policy goals of the legislation, id.
2. The legislature's decision to not amend section
129.5 even after Hec;s and Atkisson interpreted
it to include .unmarried couples^compels adoption
of the Hess and Atkisson interpretations.
The legislature's intent to adopt a definition of marital 
status that includes unmarried couples can be inferred by its 
choice not to aunend the FEHA after two California Court of Appeal 
cases defined the term to include unmarried couples. Atkisson v. 
Kern County Housing Authority. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1976) (holding 
that a policy forbidding unmarried couples from living together 
constituted discrimination based on marital status); Hess v. Fair 
F.mnlovment and Housing Commission. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232 (1982) 
(adopting a broad definition of marital status which includes 
unmarried couples). The Atkisson and Hess opinions are important 
for they placed the legislature on notice that the courts are 
interpreting marital status to include unmarried cohabitating 
couples. See Estate of McDill. 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-838 (1975). 
This Court stated that it is assumed that the legislature knows of 
the current law and the interpretation the courts have given it. 
Id. at 837. When the legislature writes a statute or modifies the 
existing law, they are assumed to take the interpretation of the 
appellate courts into account. Id. Failure to change a law in 
light of the current interpretation is indicative that there is an 
intent and approval to leave the law as it stands, id. at 878.
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Thus, in the present case, the legislature is assumed to know and 
approve the definition of marital status as interpreted by the 
California Courts of Appeal in the Hess and Atikisson decisions.
The California Legislature has had ample opportunity to adopt 
a narrower interpretation of marital status by amending section 
12955, but has declined to do so. The latest changes in section 
12955 occurred in 1992 and 1993. Cal. Gov't Code § 12955 
(historical notes). Since the decision in Atkisson nineteen years 
ago, the legislature has chosen to leave the interpretation of 
marital status as stated in Atkisson and Hess.
B. California Case Law Has Established That Marital
Status Does include Unmarried Counlpg.
California case law supports Phillips' and Randall's 
contention that the term marital status includes unmarried 
cohabitating couples. (C.T. 8.) In Hess, the California Court of 
Appeal held that landlords cannot use one qualifying criteria for 
unmarried cohabitating couples and another qualifying criteria for 
married couples without violating the protections of the FEHA. 
H6SS/ 138 Cal. App. 3d at 232. The court adopted a definition of 
marital status which includes unmarried cohabitating couples. Td. 
at 23 6. The court reasoned that the FEHA was designed to stop the 
sort of discriminatory practice that the landlord practiced, id. 
at 235. Furthermore, the court found that no legitimate business 
practice existed that would allow landlords to discriminate 
against a couple because they were not married, id. at 236.
The court in Hess based its decision on Atkisson. Hess. 138 
Cal. App. 3d at 235. Atkisson challenged the Housing Authority's 
policy of forbidding individuals of the opposite sex from living 
together in low income housing units. Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d 
at 93. The court held that the policy was a violation based on
8
marital status. at 99. Moreover, the prohibition against
unmarried couples was contrary to public policy because it would 
prevent unmarried parents from establishing an intimate 
relationship with their children, id^
By similar reasoning to that of the Courts of Appeal,
Phillips and Randall should be granted the full protection of the 
FEHA based on their marital status. Landlords should not be 
allowed to discriminate against tenants due to random distinctions 
between "unmarried couples" versus "married couples". To reach 
the FEHA's goals of eradicating discrimination, landlords cannot 
continue to draw arbitrary lines between groups that are protected 
in order to escape liability. Rather, tenants such as Phillips 
and Randall should be afforded the full protection of the FEHA, 
which includes prevention of unjustified discrimination against 
unmarried couples. Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235. The 
elimination of this arbitrary distinction will not only make it 
more difficult for landlords to discriminate, it will promote the 
public policy objective of preventing harmful discrimination.
C. Public Policy Reasons Protect Against Unlawful 
Discrimination in the Housing Market.
Public policy considerations also favor an interpretation of 
marital status that encompasses unmarried couples. The 
legislature stated, "the practice of discrimination because of . . 
. marital status ... in housing accommodations is declared to be 
against public policy." Cal. Gov't Code § 12920. Failure to 
protect unmarried couples in the housing market would be contrary 
to the legislature's goal of preventing arbitrary discrimination. 
The statutory language in Government Code section 12993(a) 
explicitly declares that the provisions regarding housing 
discrimination should be 'construed liberally' to accomplish the
9
goals of the FEHA. Cal. Govt Code 5 12993 (West Supp. 1995). 
Furthermore, the legislature asserted that the chapter on housing 
discrimination should provide as much protection regarding marital 
status discrimination as any other California state law. Cal. 
Gov't Code § 12993(a). Thus, construing the meaning of marital 
status to include unmarried cohabitating couples fits in with the 
liberal construction that the legislature intended for the FEHA.
D- Ibe Leaislaturp tn^ended thar All Clas.sificatioiiS
ETQtecr.ftd Undpr ^he Act Be Fmial: Therpfore. Courts
tlUSt Grant Marital Staf.us as Murh Protection as
the OthpT^ Classifications.
The FEHA provides identical protection between the enumerated 
classifications and equally prohibits discrimination among the 
listed classes. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12920. Nowhere in the FEHA 
does the legislature declare an intent to provide one protected 
classification any more protection than the other classifications. 
Cal. Gov’t Code S§ 12920, 12993. Furthermore, the legislature 
explicitly changed the order in which the classes were listed in 
section 12955 to de-emphasize the importance of the order.
Compare Cal. Govt code § 12955(h) with § 12955 (i).
Respondent contends that marital status deserves less 
protection than the other enumerated classifications, insinuating 
that the government is less concerned with providing protection 
for marital status. Her assertion is erroneous for several 
reasons. First, her contention contradicts the legislative goal 
of providing a liberal construction of the FEHA's protections.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12920, In fact, the legislature has 
specifically granted more protection to all the listed classes 
than under comparable state emd federal laws. Cal. Gov't Code § 
12966.6 (West Supp. 1995). Second, the legislature placed all of 
the classifications within the FEHA on equal footing. Cal. Govt
10
Code § 12920. Respondent's contention implies that the 
legislature made a mistake by doing so. In essence. Respondent is 
substituting her views for the plain wording of the statute.
Third, Respondent's reasoning depends on examples from Equal 
Protection analysis. Yet, this case does not involve an Equal 
Protection issue. Finally, differentiating between enumerated 
classifications as Respondent proposes eviscerates the legislative 
goal of eliminating all arbitrary housing discrimination.
Providing identical protection to each enumerated class is 
compelled by the legislative goal. id.
E. The Fair Employment and Housing Act Incorporates
Section 51 of the California Unruh Act. Which
Makes it Unlawful for Anv Person to Arbitrarily
Discriminate in a Business Establishment.
The California legislature made it an unlawful practice to 
deny any right created by section 51 of the California Unruh Civil 
Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West Supp. 1995). Section 51 
provides that, "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state 
are free and equal, and . . . are entitled to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in 
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Although 
section 51 does enumerate certain restricted categories of 
prohibited discrimination, this Court has held that the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act applies to all persons, not only the enumerated 
classes. Marina Point. Ltd, v. Wolfson. 30 Cal. 3d 721, cert. 
denied. 459 U.S. 858 (1982). This interpretation is supported by 
the legislative intent of preventing businesses from engaging in 
arbitrary discrimination in access to pxiblic accommodations.
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors. 52 Cal. 3d 1142 (1991). The 
California Courts' liberal construction of the Unruh Act to 
protect people from unreasoncdDle discrimination also supports this
11
interpretation. Crowell v. isaarg. 235 Cal. App. 2d 755 (1965).
III. THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXEMPTION FROM A NEUTRAL
AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW WHICH INCIDENTALLY AFFECTS
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.
Respondent requests that this Court excuse her from complying 
'^ith a generally applicable law that regulates discrimination in 
the housing market. (c.T. 11-12.) she contends that compliance 
'^ith the statute will force her to alter her religious beliefs, 
id* The United States Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that 
religious beliefs have never relieved an individual from following 
s general law that is not aimed at that person's religious 
beliefs. Employment Div. . p&n’t. of Human Resources v. Smith.
494 u.S. 872, 879, reh'o dpnipr] 495 u.S. 913 (1990). The Supreme 
Court emphasized that laws may not interfere with religious 
beliefs and opinions, but they may interfere with practices that 
are counter to the general laws. id. To allow an exemption for 
every religious practice would make *the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect .
• . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." id.
To prevent this result, the Supreme Court developed and 
adopted the incidental effect test as the primary test to analyze 
the effect of neutral and generally applicable laws on religious 
practices. California, which has consistently followed the United 
States Supreme Court's decisions regarding the application and 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, should adopt the Smith 
incidental effect test.
A. The incidental Effect. Test Defined in smith is 
the Appropriate Test to Analyze the Burden of a
State Action on an individual's Religious Practice.
The incidental effect test developed in Smith is the 
principal test for courts to use in analyzing the burden of a
12
state action on an individual's religious practice. The smith 
case involved an Oregon criminal law forbidding the use of 
controlled substances. Smith. 494 U.S. at 874, An organization 
fired two Native Americans who used peyote for sacramental 
purposes. l^L. The Court held that Oregon's prohibition on drug 
use was permissible under the Free Exercise Clause and, therefore, 
the state was permitted to control the use of drugs by Native 
Americans. 1<L. at 890. The Supreme Court's decision provided a
clarification of the proper test to resolve the tension between an 
individual's religious practice and the government's application 
of a neutral and generally applicable law. Id. at 886. For such 
an analysis, the Supreme Court chose to abandon the compelling 
state interest test developed in Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398 
(1963). Id. at 884. Instead, the Court adopted the incidental 
effect test to analyze state infringement on a person's free 
exercise rights. The Court held that the First Amendment is not 
offended if the prohibition on a religious practice is not the 
object of the statute, but an incidental effect of a neutral and 
general law. Id. at 878.
Thus, the Free Exercise Clause is not violated if the effect 
on an individual's religion is due to a neutral and generally 
applicable law. Id. The first step of the test is to assess the 
neutrality of the law by determining whether it discriminates on
its face. Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah.   U.S.
__, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993). If a law is not neutral and
generally applicable, it cannot be analyzed under the incidental 
effect test. Id. Instead, it must be analyzed under the 
compelling state interest test. id.
To determine whether a law discriminates against a religion 
on its face, the court must determine if the text explicitly
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refers to a religious practice, id. at 2227. If it does refer to 
a religious practice, it cannot be categorized as a neutral law. 
liL. If the text is not determinative, the court must survey the 
circumstances surrounding the statute's passage to uncover any 
overt or masked governmental hostility toward a religion. Id. in 
City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court analyzed three ordinances 
passed by the Hialeah city council which prohibited sacrificial 
and unnecessary killings of animals. HL. at 2228-2229. The 
ordinances made exemptions for many types of killings, except 
those for religious purposes, id. The Court found ample evidence 
that the ordinance was not neutral; in fact, the law was designed 
to suppress a specific religion's practices, id. at 2231.
Once a law is found neutral, the court must determine whether 
it is generally applicable. Id. at 2232. A generally applicable 
law equally prohibits or allows an activity by all individuals and 
does not specify or imply applicability to a specific religious 
group. Id* Even in pursuit of a legitimate interest, the 
government cannot target religiously motivated conduct without 
violating rights established by the First Amendment. id.
Neutral and generally applicable laws, therefore, do not have 
to be justified by a compelling state interest. City of 
113 S. Ct at 2226. A neutral and generally applicable law does 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause because any effect such law 
might have on a person's religious practice is incidental to the 
main purpose and intent of the law. smith. 494 U.S. at 879.
B. Where a Neutral and Generally Applicable Law Burdens
a Religious Practice Plus Another Constitutionally
Erotected Right, the court Must Analyze the Burden
Under the Compelling State Interest Test.
The Supreme Court stated that the only time the First 
Amendment right to free exercise bars application of a generally
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applicable and neutral law is when a hybrid situation exists. 
fimirh. 494 U.S. at 881. Such a situation exists when a law has an 
effect on an individual's free exercise right in addition to 
another constitutionally protected right, such as freedom of 
speech or of the press. Id. In the present case, a hybrid 
situation does not exist since the FEHA had an incidental burden 
solely on Respondent's religious practice. Thus, the incidental 
effect test of Smith is the correct test to analyze Respondent's 
claim.
If a hybrid situation does exist, however, the Court in Smith 
suggested that trial courts should use the compelling state 
interest test developed in Sherbert. Id. at 883. The Court 
reasoned that using the compelling state interest test where a 
generally applicable law imposes a burden on fields such as 
speech, press or race are constitutional norms. Id. at 885-886.
In those fields, the test ensures equality of treatment and 
unrestricted flow of information. Id. By contrast, using the 
compelling state interest test where a law burdens only a 
religious practice would produce a private right to ignore 
generally applicable laws, thus creating a constitutional anomaly. 
Id. Therefore, the Court established the rule that if a neutral 
and general law incidentally burdens an individual's religious 
practice, without inpacting other constitutional rights, the 
appropriate test is the incidental effect analysis.
In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that applying 
the compelling state interest test to a non-hybrid situation would 
invite anarchy and open the prospect of allowing exemptions from 
generally applicable laws for every conceivable constitutional 
protection. Id. at 888-889. For example, assume the compelling 
state interest test were the applicable standard to review a state
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law's effect on a person's religion. If a court granted a 
religious exemption for users of peyote contrary to a generally 
applicable law, that court would be forced to grant a religious 
exemption to any other users of narcotics who could sincerely 
claim that the use of an illegal drug is a component of their 
religious beliefs. id. at 880. This presumption is based on
the legal premise that a court is not in the position to question 
a person's religious beliefs no matter how unusual they may 
appear. The court can only assess whether those religious beliefs 
are sincerely held, smir.h. 494 U.S. at 877, 880. Since a court 
cannot make distinctions between different religions, it cannot 
pick and choose which religious groups should receive an 
exemption. Id. Thus, if a court grants an exemption to one 
group, it must grant an exemption to all other groups in a similar 
position. Id. The Court in Smith warned that the use of the 
compelling state interest test would open the possibility of 
religious exemptions in areas such as compulsory military service, 
the payment of teoces, and the administration of drug laws. Smith, 
494 U.S. at 888-889. When another constitutional right is 
implicated, however, the compelling state interest test can be 
used to analyze the burden the law has on the other right, which 
is an appropriate analysis for a court to undertake, id. at 881.
c. The compellina State Interest Test is Inaporooriatg
to Analyze the Effect a Neutral and Generally
Applicable Law Has on a Free Exercise Right. Except
in Limited Circumstances.
By formally adopting the incidental effect test, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the compelling state interest test 
is inappropriate to analyze a situation, like Respondent's, where 
the only constitutionally protected right implicated by a law is 
the free exercise right. Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-884. The Court
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has acknowledged, however, that the compelling state interest test 
may still be applicable in hybrid situations and where the law is 
not neutral and generally applicable (discussed above). city of 
Hi a 1 pah. 113 S. ct. at 2217. The court may also apply the test in 
unemployment compensation cases. Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-884.
Respondent's case does not fall under any of the above 
categories. Although unemployment benefits cases seem to fit into 
the non-hybrid category, the Court has explained why they are 
exceptions to the incidental effect test. Smith. 494 U.S. at 884. 
Application of the Sherbert test was appropriate in the 
unemployment compensation field because a mechanism existed for 
individualized governmental assessment of the worker's conduct. 
liL. The unemployment compensation statute created a device to 
allow for individualized exemptions provided there was a showing 
of 'good cause' on the part of the worker. Id. The Court pointed 
out that a state may not deny a person benefits based on religious 
hardship where it has in place a system for individual exemptions 
based on other hardships. Id. Thus, the state could only deny a 
person unemployment benefits because of religious beliefs if there 
was a compelling state interest. Id. Since the Government 
presented no evidence of a compelling state interest, it failed to 
satisfy its burden. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 407.
D. If This Court Decides that the Compelling State
Interest Test Is Appropriate in Respondent’s Case.
It Must Apply a Three Part Analysis to Identify
the Burden on Her Religious Practice. Determine
Whether a State Interest Justifies the Burden, and
Discern Whether the Law Is Narrowly Tailored.
Since this Court may decide that the compelling state 
interest test is appropriate in this case, am explanation of the 
test's procedures is appropriate. To apply the test, a court must 
first determine whether application of the statute imposes a
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substantial burden on the free exercise of a person's religion. 
Sherbert/ 374 U.S. at 403. The complaining party has the burden 
of showing that compliance with the statute would impose a 
substantial burden on a religious practice, id. A sxibstantial 
burden may be proved by the fact that the law forces an individual 
to choose between following a religious practice and obeying the 
law. at 404. The Supreme Court found that Sherbert met her
burden because the statute forced individuals to either accept the 
unemployment benefits and forgo a religious practice, or forfeit 
the unemployment benefits in order to avoid working on the Sabbath 
free from work, at 404. in addition, the Court stated that
the complaining party may also establish his burden of proof by 
showing that legislation has an indirect effect, as opposed to a 
direct effect, on a person's free exercise right, id. at 404 n.5.
Once a substantial burden is established, the court must 
analyze whether this burden is justified by some compelling state 
interest, at 406. The Court in Sherbert stated that the
government could not meet its burden merely by showing a rational 
relationship to some colorable state interest. id. The 
Government in Sherbert argued that a court-created exemption to 
the unemployment benefit law would possibly lead to the increased 
filing of fraudulent claims, id., at 407. The Court rejected 
this argument because the government did not present any evidence 
to support the contention of possible fraud, id. The Court found 
that the state interest was not compelling enough to justify the 
burden on an individual's religious practice in the absence of 
evidence of abuse, fraud, or deceit, id.
Finally, the court must analyze whether an alternative state 
action exists that will both satisfy the government's interest, 
and impose a lesser burden on religion. In sherh^r^ the Court
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stated that, even if there is a possibility of fraudulent claims, 
the government has the burden to demonstrate that no other form of 
regulation exists that would combat these possible abuses without 
burdening Free Exercise Rights. liL. at 407.
E. This Court Must AppIv the Smith Incidental Effect
TPst Because California Case Law Shows That 
ralifornia Courts Follow the United States Supreme
Courtis interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
The united States Supreme Court has stated that the Free 
Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution applies to the 
states due to the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut. 
310 U.S, 296, 303 (1940) . When interpreting the California 
Constitution's Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court of 
California has consistently followed the interpretation of the 
United States Supreme Court. People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 716
(1964) (citing Sherbert. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfield v. Brown. 
366 U.S. 599 (I960); Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 296); MgikP Y. iiQly 
Spirit Ass'n for The Unification of World Christianity. 46 Cal. 3d 
1092 (1988), pert, denied. 490 U.S. 1084 (1989) (citing Sherbert. 
374 U.S. at 398; Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 296; Wisconsin v. Yoder;
406 U.S. 205 (1972)). A primary rule of constitutional 
interpretation is that a state supreme court is the final arbiter 
of its own constitution. Sands v. Moronao Unified School
District. 53 Cal. 3d 863 (1991), cert, denied. __ U.S. __, 112 S.
Ct. 3026 (1992) (Lucas, C.J., concurring) (holding that the 
religious invocations and benedictions at a public high school 
graduation violate the Establishment Clause). Although the 
California'Supreme Court may consider and decide matters that 
arise under the California Constitution independently from the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas 
emphasized that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
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are to be given great deference when this Court deals with 
questions of state constitutional law. id. This Court went even 
further, declaring that "cogent reasons must exist before a state 
court in construing a provision of the State Constitution will 
depart from the construction placed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on a similar provision in the Federal Constitution." 
XeL. (quoting Gabriella v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89 (1938)/ 
cert, denied. 306 U.S. 621 (1939) (upholding student's expulsion 
for failure to salute flag and say pledge of allegiance due to 
religious reasons)).
Although the exact wording of the constitutional provisions 
differs slightly, the state and federal protections of free 
exercise of religion are substantially similar. Gahria 12 
Cal. 2d at 89. The United States Constitution states, "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . U.S. Const, amend. 
I. Similarly, the California Constitution states, "Free exercise 
and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are 
guaranteed." Cal. Const, art. I, § 4. The California Supreme 
Court has consistently followed the highest Court regarding the 
Free Exercise Clause because both Constitutions substantially 
protect the same rights, id.
In the present case, this Court should follow the example of 
prior California Supreme Court decisions and give great deference 
to United States Supreme Court decisions by following the ruling 
of Smith, and adopting the incidental effect test to evaluate 
state burdens on religious practice. Respondent may contend that 
the California State and United States Constitutions are distinct, 
or that cogent reasons exist whereby this Court may adopt an 
analysis different from the incidental effect test. This
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contention, however, is in direct contrast to the existing 
California Supreme Court decisions. These decisions declare that 
since the Free Exercise protections of both Constitutions are 
substantially similar, the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court are essential guides to interpretation of the State's Free 
Exercise protections. Sands. 53 Cal. 3d at 903-904. The United 
States Supreme Court has already spoken on the issue before this 
Court. Smith. 494 U.S. at 879. Its decision is entitled to great 
deference and should be followed because cogent reasons do not 
exist that would allow a departure from the incidental effect 
test. Id.
F. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
Unconstitutional.
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
in order to overturn the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith and restore the compelling state interest test established 
in Sherbert for cases involving the burden of an individual's free 
exercise rights. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The Court must not apply 
the RFRA in this case as it is an unconstitutional congressional 
act. It is unconstitutional for three reasons. First, it 
violates the well-established rule that it is the judiciary's role 
to determine what the United States Constitution allows. Marburv 
v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). Second, it was not 
enacted pursuant to an enumerated power. Third, it violates the 
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
In Marburv. the United States Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a law passed by Congress, id. at 180. The Court 
held that it is the federal judiciary's role to interpret the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 178. Since 1803, that rule 
has been upheld. Although the constitutionality of the RFRA has
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not been addressed in many cases, a United States District Court 
has declared it unconstitutional. Flnres v. Citv of Boerne. 877 
F. Supp. 355 (1995). The court based its decision on the fact 
that "Congress specifically sought to overturn Supreme Court 
precedent as found in fSmith! through passage of the RFRA." id. 
at 357, The court in Flores seriously questioned another United 
States District Court decision which upheld the passage of rfra as 
a constitutional act through section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court explained that Congress only mentioned
the First Amendment as its basis of authority for passing the 
RFRA. at 357 n.l. Thus, Congress acted pursuant to a
limiting provision, rather than pursuant to an enumerated power.
The RFRA dictates the standard of review to be applied in all 
cases involving a federal or state infringement upon the free 
exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C, § 2000bb. The First Amendment, 
which is the only constitutional provision mentioned in the RFRA, 
is a limitation on Congress, not an enximerated power. U.S. Const, 
amend. I. Although the United States Supreme Court has allowed 
Congress to enhance First Amendment rights, it has only done so 
when the enhancement was carried out through an enumerated power. 
See I e.q.. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(allowing enhancement of free speech arid press rights through the 
Commerce Clause power). Moreover, the First Amendment does not, 
by itself, allow Congress to regulate state laws with regard to 
First Amendment rights. U.S. Const, amend. I. Congress did not, 
therefore, have power to enact the RFRA. Congress not only used 
the First Amendment to exercise a power it does not have, it 
violated the limiting nature of the First Amendment as well.
The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental action that
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has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU. 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989). The RFRA does just 
that because *its principal purpose is to advance religion, or at 
least to advance the free exercise thereof, relative to other 
conscientious conduct that is not deemed religious.* Scott C. 
Idleman, The Religinns Freedom Restoration Act; Pushing the 
T^imihs of Legislative Power. 73 Tex. L. Rev, 247, 286 (1994).
Also, a governmental action may not lack a secular purpose. Stone 
V. Craham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In Stone, the Court struck down a 
Kentuclcy statute which required public schools to post the Ten 
Commandments in classrooms since the purpose for posting them was 
'plainly religious in nature.* Id^ at 41-42. Like the posting 
statute in stone, the RFRA does not have a secular purpose; its 
goal is simply to increase religious exercise by making 
infringement upon such exercise more difficult to justify. 42
U. S.C. § 2000bb.
V. IF RESPONDENT HAS A FREE EXERCISE CLAIM, SHE IS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION FROM THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
HOUSING ACT UNDER ANY OF THE POSSIBLE TESTS.
The free exercise of religion, which is guaranteed in the 
United States and California Constitutions, means the right to 
believe and profess one's religious doctrine. Smith. 494 U.S. at 
877. As such, the government may not compel people to believe in 
a religion or punish people for expressing religious beliefs with 
which it disagrees. Id.
Free exercise may involve actions or abstention from actions. 
Although the government may not ban such acts or abstentions 
because of the belief they display, it may limit or ban certain 
acts or abstentions which conflict with the law. id. at 877-878. 
*It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously 
based, are often subject to regulation by the States . . . .*
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Yoder. 406 U.S. at 220. In determining whether an action can be 
regulated by law, courts apply the facts of the case to a 
constitutional test.
The tests for determining whether a person has a right to 
exemption from a law based on the Free Exercise Clause consist of 
the following: the incidental effect test; the hybrid test; the 
compelling state interest test; or a test developed by an 
individual state. Furthermore, in 1993, the United States 
Congress passed the RFRA, which compels courts of the United 
States and of the individual states to apply the compelling state 
interest test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. Before evaluating 
Respondent's case, however, this Court must address whether she 
even has a free exercise claim.
A. Respondent Does Not Have a Free Exercise Claim
Because Commercial Conduct. Reaardless of Tts
Motivation., Must Comply with a Neutral. GeneralIv
Applicable Law-
Respondent contends that she should be able to discriminate 
against unmarried couples in violation of the FEHA because 
compliance would burden her religious freedom. (C.T. 4.)
Although the state and federal constitutions provide complete 
protection for religious beliefs, they only provide limited 
protection for religiously motivated conduct. Smiths 494 U.S. at 
877-878. Commercial conduct will be subject*to a neutral, 
generally applicable law, regardless of the motivation for that 
conduct. Jimmy Swacaart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of 
California. 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990).
Jimmy Swacaart Ministries involved a religious organization 
which sold religious materials in addition to leading evangelistic 
crusades. 1<L. at 381. The United States Supreme Court held that 
the organization had to comply with California's Sales and Use Tax
m
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Law, regardless of the motivation for the sales, id. at 390. The 
single burden on the religious organization was a decrease in 
revenue, not a violation of religious freedom. Id. Similarly, 
Respondent is engaged in a business and must, like other 
businesses, adhere to the laws which govern it. In Jiimrrv Swaaaart 
Ministries. the Court stated that the law required only that the 
religious organization remit taxes. Id. Likewise, the FEHA 
requires only that Respondent not unlawfully discriminate.
Although Respondent argues that the FEHA's burden is more than 
financial, she could simply hire a service to rent her units for 
her. This would ensure that the only burden on Respondent is a 
financial one. Also, both the organization in Jimntv Swaaaart 
Ministries and Respondent entered into a commercial activity by 
choice. Neither of them operated a business establishment because 
a religious belief required it.
Furthermore, the Unruh Act, which has been incorporated into 
the FEHA, prohibits discrimination in any business establishment. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Because Respondent rents apartments to the 
public and pays teoces on her income, she cannot argue that she 
does not run a business establishment. (C.T. 3.) Thus, as a 
business establishment. Respondent may not unlawfully discriminate 
in her business activity. Respondent argues that the Unruh Act 
does not list marital status as a prohibited type of 
discrimination. The Unruh Act's protection, however, is not 
limited to the specific categories listed. Marina Point. 30 Cal. 
3d at 732. The Unruh Act's protection has even been interpreted 
to include prohibition of discrimination based on an individual's 
hair length, in re Cox. 3 Cal. 3d 205 (1970). Because of the 
broad protection afforded by the Unruh Act, Respondent may not 
discriminate based on marital status.
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If the Court concludes that Respondent's act is religious 
conduct, rather than a business activity, it must evaluate whether 
she has a right to be exempted from complicuice with the FEHA. As 
established above, the Smith non-hybrid incidental effect test is 
the appropriate test for Respondent's case. Analysis of that test 
will show that the Free Exercise Clause, as applied to 
Respondent's case, does not provide for an exemption from the 
FEHA. Moreover, even if the Court decides to apply a different 
test, the result will be the same.
B. The Incidental Effect Test Compels Respondent fn
Comply with Anti-discrimination Laws and Not
Unlawfully Discriminate Against Unmarried
The United States Supreme Court has held that, when 
burdening the free exercise of religion is not the object of a 
neutral and generally applicable law, but merely an incidental 
effect, the right to free exercise has not been offended, smith. 
494 U.S. at 878. This incidental effect test requires the Court 
to analyze two issues. First, the Court must determine whether 
the law is valid and generally applicable, id. at 878. To be 
valid, the law must be neutral on its face and not aimed at 
impeding any particular religious conduct. City of Hialpah. 113 
S. Ct. at 2231. A neutral law cannot aim to restrict or obstruct 
religious practices. Id. at 2227.
Like the Oregon law prohibiting use of illegal narcotics 
evaluated in Smith, the FEHA is valid. It is facially neutral 
because it does not refer to a religious activity without a 
secular meaning; it does not single out a particular religion, and 
it does not address an act that is purely religious. Instead, the 
FEHA's aim is to eliminate discrimination in employment and 
housing. Cal. Gov't Code § 12920.
Unlike the Oregon criminal law, the ordinances adopted by the
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city coxancil in GitY-Ql Hialeah were not valid, city of Hialeah. 
113 S. Ct. at 2231. The city council adopted the ordinances 
relating to animal sacrifice in response to community concern 
about the Church of the Lu)cumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a faith which 
practiced the ritual sacrifice of animals. Id. at 2223, 2227- 
2228. The Court held the laws invalid based on their targeting of 
a particular religion. Id. at 2228. The laws prohibited 
sacrificial animal killings, but provided numerous exemptions.
Yet, they did not provide an exemption for killings carried out 
for religious purposes. Id. at 2228-2229. Unlike City of 
Hialeah. Respondent's case involves a law that does not have the 
effect of targeting a particular religion. Furthermore, it was 
not enacted in response to fear that a religion would engage in a 
certain religious activity. Instead, it was enacted to eliminate 
discrimination in employment and housing. Cal. Gov't Code §
12920.
Second, the Court must determine whether the law is generally 
applicable, i.e., if it is a law that applies to all people or all 
people involved in a certain area of business. City of Hialeah. 
113 S. Ct. at 2232. In Smith, the Oregon law prohibiting drug use 
was generally applicable because it applied to all people. Smith. 
494 U.S. at 874. Similarly, the FEHA is generally applicable. It 
applies to anyone who rents housing and to any business 
establishment. Cal. Gov't Code § 12955.
A finding that a law is neutral and generally applicable 
means that any effect on religious behavior is incidental; 
therefore, no compelling state interest is needed to justify 
application of the state law. City of Hialeah. 113 S. Ct. at 
2226. Yet, if the Court decides that there is a hybrid situation, 
i.e. that Respondent has a free exercise claim together with
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another constitutional claim, it must apply the Smith hybrid test. 
Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-882.
C. Resnondent^s Case Does Not Present a Hybrid Situation
Her Only Claim Is Free Exercise of Religion.
In Smith, the Court stated that, except for the unemployment 
benefits area, the only time it had found that a neutral and 
generally applicable law was invalid was when a free exercise 
claim coexisted with another constitutional right, id. at 881. 
See. P.CT.■ Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 304-307 (invalidating a system 
for licensing religious and charitable solicitations where the 
administrator could, in his discretion, deny a license for any 
purpose he considered nonreligious); Yoder. 406 U.S. at 205 
(invalidating mandatory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish 
parents who would not send their children to school). The 
Cantwell case involved both a free exercise claim and a free 
speech claim because the licensing law affected not only religious 
freedom rights, but freedom of speech rights. Smith. 494 U.S. at 
881. In Yoder, the issues were free exercise of religion and the 
right of parents to direct the education of their children, id.
In those cases, the Court applied the balancing test which Smith 
has required courts to use in hybrid situations. Xd-. at 885-886. 
Respondent's case, however, does not present a hybrid situation.
Respondent, when faced with the allegation that she had 
discriminated against Phillips and Randall, explained that her 
discrimination was based on a religious belief that fornication is 
a sin. (C.T. 4.) At the administrative hearing, Respondent's 
only claim for an exemption from the FEHA was based on her free 
exercise rights. (C.T. 4.) No free speech claim could have 
existed based on the FEHA's provision prohibiting discrimination 
in housing. Cal. Gov't Code § 12955. Even after the Commission
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issued an order stating that Respondent had unlawfully 
discriminated and requiring her to sign and post notices 
acknowledging her unlawful conduct. Respondent did not raise a 
free speech claim. (C.T. 10,14.) Although a free speech claim 
cannot be waived, the fact that Respondent did not raise such a 
claim at the hearing, or in her application for a writ of mandate, 
shows that she did not believe her free speech rights had been 
infringed upon. {C.T. 19-23.) Although Respondent now argues 
that her free speech rights have been burdened, she still does not 
have a free speech claim.
Respondent has not contended that the Act 'represents an 
attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of 
religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those 
beliefs. . . .' Smith. 494 U.S. at 882. Instead, she bases her 
claim on the order handed down by the Commission. That order, 
however, came after the Commission's determination that Respondent 
had violated the FEHA. (C.T. 10,14.) The determination of 
Respondent's unlawful discriminatory practice stands alone, 
without the order. Furthermore, the order can be severed, 
eliminating the parts which might affect Respondent's free speech 
rights. In other words, the Commission's decision that Respondent 
unlawfully discriminated, as well as its order that she cease and 
desist doing so, can be separated from the part of the order that 
requires her to post notices. This solution would solve any 
possible free speech claim which might have arisen out of the 
order. If, however, the Court finds that there is a hybrid 
situation, it must apply the Smith hybrid test. Smith. 494 U.S. 
at 885-886.
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D. A Finding Thar. There Is a Hybrid Situation, or
That the Rfiliaious Freedom Restoration Act is
Constitutional, or That California Mav Apply Its
Own Test. Ramiires the Court to Apply the Compelling
State TntPrPst Ta^t.
The Smith hybrid test, as well as the test mandated in the 
RFRA and the California Molko test, requires courts to engage in 
the compelling interest balancing test. Smith. 494 U.S. at 885- 
886; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Molko. 46 Cal. 3d at 1113, The outcome 
of the compelling state interest test, therefore, will determine 
the result of each of those tests.
E. Application of the Compellina statP mt^rpst Tpgt
If the Court decides to apply the compelling state interest 
test, it must engage in a balancing analysis. Smith, 494 U.S. at 
882-883. First, the Court must determine whether the FEHA imposes 
a substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise of religion. 
Shsrbsrt/ 374 U.S. at 403. Second, the Court must determine 
whether there is a compelling governmental interest which 
outweighs the burden on Respondent's free exercise. id. at 407. 
Sherbert/ which established the test, stated that *[n]ot all 
burdens on religion are unconstitutional,' id. at 403. Finally, 
the Court must determine whether an alternative state action 
exists which would impose a lesser burden, id. at 407. Analysis 
of the test will demonstrate that, not only is there no 
substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise, but there is an 
extremely compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination 
in housing with no less restrictive alternatives.
1. Application of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act does not substantially burden Respondent's
free exercise of religion.
Because the law does not completely protect religiously 
motivated actions, when a court applies the compelling state
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interest test, the law must be found to substantially burden an 
individual's free exercise before a court will even consider 
whether there is a compelling state interest. Id. In Sherbert. 
where a member of the Seventh Day Adventist religion was denied 
unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the unemployment 
benefits law imposed a substantial burden on her Free Exercise 
rights, id. at 403. The applicant, who could not find a job that 
would not require her to work on Saturdays, was forced to either 
receive benefits and not follow her religion, or forgo the 
benefits and observe the Sabbath day. id. at 404. Although the 
law's burden was indirect, its effect was to impede the observance 
of the applicant's religion, id.
In another United States Supreme Court case, the Court 
invalidated a compulsory school attendcuice law as applied to 
members of the Amish faith. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 234. Despite a 
Wisconsin law that mandated school attendance until the age of 16, 
Amish parents elected not to send their children to school past 
the eighth grade. Id. at 207, 212. The Amish based this decision 
on the belief that after children learn basic reading and writing 
skills, they must learn to work in the Amish community which 
favors manual work and self-reliance. Id. at 211. Applying the 
compelling state interest test, the Court held that application of 
the law would result in a severe and inescapable burden on the 
Amish because it would force them to perform acts which go 
completely against their religious beliefs. Id. at 218.
In contrast to Sherbert and Yoder. application of the FEHA to 
Respondent does not cause a substantial burden. Unlike in 
Sherbert. Respondent is not forced to choose between having food 
on the table and practicing her religion. She has chosen to be in
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the business of renting housing. She also chose to inquire about 
the marital status of couples, although her religion does not 
require her to make such an inquiry.i There are alternative ways 
for Respondent to earn a living if she does not want to obey the 
laws governing the business she has chosen. Both the FEHA and the 
Unruh Act prohibit discrimination, one in housing and employment 
and one in business establishments. Cal. Gov't Code § 12955; Cal. 
Civ. Code § 51.
Second, in both Sherbert and Yoder, the individuals claiming 
an exemption would actively have had to do something that they 
believed it was a sin to do, i.e. work on the Sabbath day or send 
children to high school. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 404; Yoder. 406 
U.S. at 218. In Respondent's case, the law would not force her to 
fornicate, which she believes is a sin. Neither would it force 
her to help others fornicate. This is not a situation where the 
mother of a teenager allows her child to fornicate in her home. 
This case involves two adults who do not need "help* in 
fornicating. It would simply prohibit her from discriminating 
against unmarried couples in housing and in a business 
establishment. After all, an unmarried, cohabitating couple that 
engages in sexual intercourse will do so whether they live in a 
home rented from Respondent or not.
Third, in both Sherbet and Yoder, the religiously motivated 
conduct only affected those practicing the religion, when the 
applicant in Sherbert chose to observe the Sabbath, she did not 
impact others by imposing her religious beliefs on them, when the
1 Respondent claims that she did not inquire about the marital 
status of Phillips and Randall. Yet, the record shows that after informing 
them that she did not rent to unmarried couples, she asked them how long they 
had been married. (C.T. 4.) In effect, this question constituted an inquiry 
into their marital status.
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parents in Yoder did not send their children to high school, they 
did not affect anyone but others who adhered to their religious 
faith. In contrast. Respondent's conduct directly affects others 
in an adverse way. When she chose to discriminate against 
Phillips and Randall and other unmarried couples, she deprived 
them of a necessity -- housing.
Unlike sherbet eUid Yoder, the United States Supreme Court did 
not find a substantial burden in a case involving a religious 
organization which sold religious materials. Jimmv Swaaaart 
Ministries. 493 U.S. 378 at 392. The Court held that application 
of California's Sales and Use Tax Law did not substantially burden 
the organization's free exercise rights. Id. at 389. The Court 
stated that the tax applied to all individuals who make retail 
sales of tangible personal property. Id^ at 390. Because the 
religious organization sold personal property, it had to comply 
with the tax law, regardless of the motivation for the sales, id. 
at 696. The Court held that there was no substantial burden on 
the religious organization because a decrease in revenue would not 
amount to a constitutionally significant burden. Id^ Similarly, 
Respondent is engaged in a business which must, like other 
businesses, adhere to the laws which govern it. Just as the 
religious organization did not want to pay taxes for religious 
reasons, Respondent does not want to comply with non­
discrimination laws for religious reasons. Yet, she must because 
she is in the business of renting, just like the religious 
organization was in the business of making retail sales.
Unlike Jimmv Swaaaart Ministries, this Court did not find a 
substantial burden in Molko. where it applied the existing federal 
law, i.e., the compelling state interest test. Molko. 46 Cal. 3d 
at 1092. This Court held that subjecting the church to liability
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for fraud would burden, but not substantially burden, the church's 
free exercise rights. Id. at 1117. The purpose of the licUDility 
was to discourage the Church from committing religiously 
motivated, fraudulent conduct by exposing it to possible monetary 
loss. Thus, the church would not be ed^le to recruit new
members without being liable for the use of deceptive tactics. 
liL. Yet, the burden was not substantial because it did not 
prevent the church members from having a religious community, 
holding meetings, worshiping, associating freely, and 
proselytizing on the street. Id. This court distinguished Ynd^r 
based on the fact that subjecting the Unification church to 
liability for fraud would not force the church members to commit 
acts undeniably at odds with their religious beliefs, id. 
Similarly, applying the FEHA to Respondent would not make her 
commit acts against her religious beliefs. It would simply compel 
her to comply with the laws governing the business activity she 
has chosen. She would simply have to cease unlawfully 
discriminating against unmarried couples if she wishes to continue 
her in the rental business.
If, however, the Court decides that application of the FEHA 
does impose a substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise of 
religion, it must determine whether there” is a compelling state 
interest which outweighs that burden because *(n]ot all burdens on 
religion are unconstitutional.- United States v. t.pp. 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982).
2. The State ■■Of California has a cnmnellina statP
interest in eradicating invidious digcriminatinn
in housing and business establishTnpn^g
Under the compelling state interest test, once a court finds 
that a law substantially burdens an individual's free exercise 
rights, it must consider whether there is a compelling state
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interest which will justify the infringement. Sherbert. 374 U.S. 
at 406. In Yoder. the Court held that such a compelling state 
interest did not exist because the state's interest in educating 
children and preparing them for the future was outweighed by the 
Amish parents' free exercise rights and rights to direct their 
childrens' education. Yoder. 206 U.S. at 229. The Court 
acknowledged that the state had an interest in preparing its 
citizens to be self-sufficient and participate in the political 
process. at 221. Yet, because of the Amish faith's unique
community life-style, that state interest was not compelling. Id. 
at 222, 229. The Amish have a formal vocational education system 
which has a long tradition and is very effective. Id. at 222.
The state's interest was, in effect, fulfilled because the Amish 
do not refuse to educate, they have simply devised an equally 
effective educational system of their own. Id. at 223. In 
contrast, California's compelling interest in eliminating 
invidious discrimination in housing and business establishments 
will not be fulfilled if Respondent is granted an exemption from 
the FEHA. Instead, it will be completely undermined because she 
will actually effectuate the opposite result.
Unlike Yoder, the United States Supreme Court found a 
compelling state interest in Lee, where a member of the Amish 
faith asserted that compelling him to pay social security taxes 
would violate his free exercise rights because the Amish faith 
forbids payment of social security taxes. Lee. 455 U.S. at 258- 
259. The burden on the Amish was not unconstitutional because the 
government's strong interest in maintaining a vital social 
security system outweighed the right to free exercise. Id. 
Similarly, because housing is a fundamental need in life, the 
State of California has a strong interest in eradicating
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discrimination in housing and business establishments. Cal.
Health St Safety Code S 50003b (West Supp. 1995) . The California 
Legislature stated that its basic housing goal is to provide a 
•decent* home and 'suitable* living environment for every 
California family. Id. Respondent argues that allowing her an 
exemption will not deny Phillips and Randall housing because they 
can find it elsewhere. That argument, however, fails to recognize 
the total effect of this stance on the state's compelling 
interest.
Allowing an exemption for Respondent could open the door to 
numerous claims for exemptions based on religious beliefs. See 
Smith/ 494 U.S. at 880. The Court expressed its fear of this 
potential increase in claims in Lee. Lee. 455 U.S. at 260. If an 
exemption were allowed for Lee, many others would claim exemptions 
from taxes for a myriad of reasons. Id. The Lee Court pointed 
out that the social security system could not afford to 
accommodate the many different religions that exist in the United 
States, at 259. The Court distinguished Yoder. observing
that few people follow a faith that believes it is wrong to send 
children to high school. Id. at 259-260. In contrast, many 
different religious reasons could be found for the belief that 
paying taxes violates religious principles, id. at 260.
Likewise, if an exemption is allowed for Respondent, she and 
other landlords will be allowed to legally discriminate against 
individuals because of their race, gender, nationality, or other 
characteristics. For instance, a Catholic might discriminate 
against a divorcee based on the belief that it is a sin to get 
divorced. A Christian might discriminate against a couple where 
one person is a Christian and the other is not since many 
Christians believe that such a couple is incompatible. A member
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of the Nation of Islam might discriminate against an inter-racial 
couple based on the belief that races should not inter-marry. A 
fundamentalist Christian might discriminate against members of any 
other religion based on the belief that all non-Christians are 
sinners who will go to hell. Hindus, who do not believe in eating 
cows, might discriminate against members of any religion which 
permits eating beef. Like the Court's reasoning in Lee, the 
myriad of possibilities that would flow from an exemption for 
Respondent is numerous and serious ominous foreboding.
California's interest in eradicating invidious discrimination must 
be as compelling as the federal government's interest in 
collecting taxes.
An exemption from the FEHA would allow Respondent to 
immediately break a law, and it is likely that other landlords 
would take advantage of such an exemption to act on biases, not 
only against unmarried couples, but against other vulnerable 
groups in our society, including mixed-race couples, homosexual 
couples, and single mothers.
3. Phillips and Randall have a fundamental right 
to freedom of asgoriar,inn and privarv which
supnlemfinf- r.he compelling state interest.
Along with the state's compelling state interest in 
eliminating discrimination in housing, Phillips euid Randall have 
the constitutional rights of freedom of association and privacy. 
First, the Constitution provides the freedom of intimate 
association to relationships in small, close groups. Roberts v. 
united States Javcees. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). An individual 
has a right to intimate association where, like in a family, there 
are "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
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aspects of one's life.* id. at 620. Respondent's policy of 
unlawful discrimination prohibits Phillips and Randall from 
exercising their right of association.
Second, the California Constitution provides Phillips and 
Randall the right to privacy. Cal. Const, art. I, § 1. That 
constitutional provision provides a right against private and 
government entities. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn,. 
Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994). They have a right to choose with whom they 
live. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 
(1980). They also have a protected privacy interest in their 
marital status. Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98-100. Respondent 
claims that she simply informed Phillips and Randall that she does 
not rent to unmarried couples and that they volunteered their 
marital status. Yet, the record states •Respondent told 
complainants that she would not rent to unmarried couples, and she 
asked complainants how long they had been married.' (C.T. 4.)
The question Respondent asked cannot be characterized as anything 
but an inquiry into the marital status of Phillips and Randall.
Although this Court in Hill stated that a privacy claim might 
fail as against a countervailing interest, the claim does not fail 
here. Hill/ 7 Cal. 4th at 40. The right of privacy combines with 
the right to intimate association and California's compelling 
interest in eradicating discrimination to overcome the burden on 
Respondent's religious freedom. Furthermore, there is no less 
restrictive means by which the state can fulfill its interest.
4. There is no alternative state action which 
would impose a lesser burden on Respondent.
After a finding the the state has a compelling state 
interest, the court must make one final inquiry. The compelling 
state interest test rec[uires that the court determine whether the
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state's interest can be achieved by any less restrictive means. 
Thomas v. Review Bd.. Ind. Emol. Sec. Div.. 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981). In Molko. this Court found that subjecting the church to 
liability for fraud was the least restrictive means of carrying 
out its goal of public safety, peace and order. Molko. 46 Cal. 3d 
at 1118. Among the alternatives this Court considered were making 
brainwashing a crime, authorizing involuntary deprogramming of 
individuals, and requiring proselytizer to obtain informed consent 
before trying to gain new members. Id. at 1119. This Court 
concluded that all the approaches would impose a greater burden 
than the tort liability. Id. The first would involve coercion by 
the state and might result in church members going to jail, the 
second posed inherently severe burdens, and the last would require 
active dissemination of information about a religion's nature.
Like Molko. requiring Respondent to comply with the Act is 
the least restrictive means of carrying out the state's interest 
in eliminating discrimination in housing. Criminalizing 
discrimination in housing would pose more of a burden on 
Respondent than simply requiring her to not discriminate because, 
like Molko. it would require the coercive power of the state and 
could result in her going to jail. As stated by the Alaska 
Supreme Court, *tt)he most effective tool the state has for 
combating discrimination is to prohibit discrimination; these laws 
do exactly that.' Swanner. 874 P.2d at 280.
VI. ALLOWING RESPONDENT AN EXEMPTION FROM THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
A14D HOUSING ACT WOULD VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS.
Even if the Court applies the compelling interest test and
finds that there is no compelling state interest which outweighs
the burden on Respondent, the creation of an exemption would
violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
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Constitution. The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental 
action that has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. 
County of Allegheny. 492 U.S. at 597. The state cannot, 
therefore, promote a religion by lending its support. Td. An 
exemption from the FEHA gives support to Respondent's religious 
belief and allows her to shift the burden of her belief onto 
Phillips and Randall. Respondent argues that she is not imposing 
her beliefs on others, but merely maintaining them herself. Yet, 
the fact that tenants must fit within her belief structure, or be 
denied housing, demonstrates that she is imposing her beliefs on 
others.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must hold: (1) that 
the term "marital status' includes unmarried couples; (2) that the 
proper test for determining whether the right to free exercise 
provides for an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable 
law is that established in Smith: and (3) that regardless of the 
test used. Respondent may not be exempt from complying with the 
FEHA and the Unruh Act.
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